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Abstract 
The conceptions of reflective practice in education have their roots at least partly in the work of Dewey, 
who describes reflection as “the active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed 
form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” 
(Dewey 1933, p.9). This conception of reflection has carried on into more-focused efforts to describe 
critical reflection as a tool for improving professional practice (where academic and educational practice 
is the particular interest of this study); “… some puzzling or troubling or interesting phenomenon” allows 
the practitioner to access “the understandings which have been implicit in his action, understandings 
which he surfaces, criticizes, restructures, and embodies in further action” (Schön 1983, p. 50). Both of 
these descriptions embody a central idea of critical reflective practice: that the examination of practice 
involves the divination (in a rational, critical sense) of order and perhaps meaning from the facts at hand 
(which, in turn, are brought to light by the events that occur as the results of implementation of theory). As 
part of a lecture series, Gottlieb defined science as “an intellectual activity carried out by humans to 
understand the structure and functions of the world in which they live” (Gottlieb 1997). While science and 
critical reflective practice attempt to build models about different parts of our world – the natural world 
and the world of professional (educational) practice respectively – both embody certain underlying aims 
and methodologies. Indeed, it is striking that in these definitions the simple replacement of the 
terminology of reflective practice with the terminology of science (or vice versa) leads to a perfectly 
comprehensible definition of either. 
It is this confluence that this paper studies, building from two separate foundations, critical reflective 
practice and science. Via their models and exemplars of their “models-in-practice” – action research and 
the scientific method – the paper forms a bridge between two empirical practices. We contend that the 
ability to do this is no accident, but stems from a deeper substrate that they have in common: empirical 
epistemology, as expressed in post-enlightenment models of the development of reliable knowledge. 
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(Dewey 1933, p.9). This conception of reflection has carried on into more-focused efforts to describe 
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is the particular interest of this study); “… some puzzling or troubling or interesting phenomenon” allows 
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It is this confluence that this paper studies, building from two separate foundations, critical reflective 
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Synergies in critical reflective practice and science: Science as 
reflection and reflection as science 
Luke Mathieson, University of Newcastle, luke.mathieson@newcastle.edu.au  
Another error is an impatience of doubt, and haste to assertion without due and 
mature suspension of judgment.  For the two ways of contemplation are not unlike 
the two ways of action commonly spoken of by the ancients: the one plain and 
smooth in the beginning, and in the end impassable; the other rough and 
troublesome in the entrance, but after a while fair and even. So it is in 
contemplation: if a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he 
will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties. 
Francis Bacon (1605) 
Introduction 
The conceptions of reflective practice in education have their roots at least partly in the work of 
Dewey, who describes reflection as “the active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief 
or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further 
conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey 1933, p.9).  This conception of reflection has carried on 
into more-focused efforts to describe critical reflection as a tool for improving professional 
practice (where academic and educational practice is the particular interest of this  study);  “… 
some puzzling or troubling or interesting phenomenon” allows the practitioner to access “the 
understandings which have been implicit in his action, understandings which he surfaces, 
criticizes, restructures, and embodies in further action” (Schön 1983, p. 50). Both of these 
descriptions embody a central idea of critical reflective practice: that the examination of practice 
involves the divination (in a rational, critical sense) of order and perhaps meaning from the facts at 
hand (which, in turn, are brought to light by the events that occur as the results of implementation 
of theory). As part of a lecture series, Gottlieb defined science as “an intellectual activity carried 
out by humans to understand the structure and functions of the world in which they live” (Gottlieb 
1997). While science and critical reflective practice attempt to build models about different parts 
of our world – the natural world and the world of professional (educational) practice respectively – 
both embody certain underlying aims and methodologies. Indeed, it is striking that in these 
definitions the simple replacement of the terminology of reflective practice with the terminology 
of science (or vice versa) leads to a perfectly comprehensible definition of either.  
It is this confluence that this paper studies, building from two separate foundations, critical 
reflective practice and science. Via their models and exemplars of their “models-in-practice” – 
action research and the scientific method – the paper forms a bridge between two empirical 
practices. We contend that the ability to do this is no accident, but stems from a deeper substrate 
that they have in common: empirical epistemology, as expressed in post-enlightenment models of 
the development of reliable knowledge. 
Models of Critical Reflective Practice 
Although we are primarily interested in critical reflective practice as a tool for advancing teaching 
practice, it is clearly also a meta-cognitive learning process: it involves thinking and learning 
about how we think about teaching). Thus much of the background theory for reflective practice 
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derives from theory about learning. As a result of these broader beginnings, there are many models 
of critical reflective practice.  
 
Figure 1. A visualisation of Kolb's experiential learning process. Source: 
http://www.learning-theories.com/experiential-learning-kolb.html 
Possibly the earliest attempt at formalising the ideas of critical reflection (here we specifically 
emphasise our use of the word critical) is the contrast between single-loop and double-loop 
learning laid out by Argyris and Schön (1978). They built on their earlier hypothesis (Argyris & 
Schön 1974) regarding the “mental maps” people (or organisations) use to conduct their actions. 
The single-loop approach, in essence, does not learn from errors – that is, it does not reflect. 
Argyris (1980) later argued that much of this behaviour may be due to the people or organisations 
being unaware of their models of behaviour – that is, they are uncritical. The critical reflective 
approach, in their conception, is embodied by the double-loop learning approach, in which models 
are modified in response to failures so that in similar situations the model will hopefully be less 
likely to fail. Being one of the simpler models, it clearly shows the basic components of critical 
reflective practice: a critical incident, reflective consideration and modification of mental models, 
connected in an iterative structure of continually attempted improvement. 
Influenced by Piaget’s (1926; 2001) ideas of reflective abstraction in developmental learning, 
Kolb (1984) developed a reflective-practice model based on experimental experience; he wrote 
that “learning is the process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of 
experience” (Kolb 1984, p. 38). In dealing with learning in general, rather than professional 
practice, Kolb presents a more adaptable model that more clearly identifies four basic steps of 
critical reflection: experience, reflective observation, conceptualisation (or modelling) and 
experimentation (Figure 1). The important advancement that Kolb’s model makes on that of 
Argyris and Schön (1974) is the explicit recognition of the importance of experimentation in the 
learning process. Although Argyris and Schön refer to applying the new model when similar 
situations arise, Kolb’s model explicitly emphasises the conscious and directed act of testing the 
new model to validate it as a step within the same iteration of the cycle, rather than the start of a 
new cycle (although all of these models very easily become recursive, generating cycles within 
cycles). This demonstrates the meta-cognitive component of effective critical reflective practice. 
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Gibbs (1988) expanded on Kolb’s more abstract model by providing a series of practice-oriented 
tools to help practitioners engage productively in the steps of Kolb’s learning cycle. One 
prominent tool he proposed was the structured debriefing, which employs directed questions to 







6. Action plan. 
Although this process is more detailed than Kolb’s broader model, the distinct, important 
components of identification of a problem (step 1), reflection on the implications (steps 2 and 3), 
adjustment of current models (steps 4 and 5) and experimental verification or plans (step 6) are 
again present. 
Johns (1994, 1995) provides an even more structured practical guide for critical reflection. 
Because it was specifically formulated for reflection in nursing practice, Johns’s model is quite 
precise and detailed. However, as Cox (2006) highlights, the fundamental learning cycle is still 
present in its four underlying stages: 
1. Description of experience 
2. Reflection 
3. Influencing factors 
4. Learning. 
Here the experimental step is deemphasised. Johns also attempts to bring in other modes of 
“knowing” (Carper 1978), in a reaction to the apparent over-emphasis of “empirical” observation 
in nursing. However, a more considered examination of Carper’s patterns of knowing reveal that 
this use of “empirical” is restricted and peculiar – in fact all four modes are empirical in the sense 
that they are a posteriori rather than a priori knowledge. As Grech (2004, p. 71) notes, “Central to 
Johns’ idea of reflective practice is the goal of accessing, understanding and learning through lived 
experience.” 
 
Figure 2. Rolfe et al.'s simplified model of reflection. Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reflective_practice 
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Rolfe, Freshwater and Jasper (2001) (again from the area of nursing reflection practice) simplify 
the loop to three simple questions (Figure 2): what, so what and what next? Although this is a 
much simpler model, it manages to bring forward a key aspect of critical reflection: that it is an 
active, experiential process designed to gather empirical evidence, analyse it and provide 
adjustments (possibly dramatic adjustments) to the cognitive models of relevant practice to 
facilitate improvement. 
To bring these ideas back to the philosophical underpinnings, critical reflection is concerned with 
how models of practice can be altered to be as accurate and useful as possible in a reliable way. 
That is, critical reflection is a practical implementation of epistemology, applied to conscious 
practices and processes that humans undertake. 
Action Research 
Action research is an interesting offshoot of reflective practice, with a variety of generative ideas 
from various thinkers. It describes a loose series of methods for engaging in action, with the 
common tie that the processes are reflective. For our purposes it provides examples of robust 
methodologies for the conduct of research (where we emphasise the French root of the word 
rechercher – to search). 
One theory is developed from Argyris’s work on Action Science (Argyris 1970, 1980, 1994; 
Argyris, Putnam & Smith 1985) that emphasises collaboration and research, in contrast to theories 
that emphasise the individual reflective practitioner in a situation of professional practice. It can be 
noted that research itself is a form of professional practice, thus this distinction of context may not 
be relevant. Action research attempts to draw a contrast to experimental research in that 
experimental research controls (or attempts to control) all variables in a situation, leading to an 
isolated environment. 
 
Figure 3. A generalised representation of action research based on Lewin’s model (Lewin 
1946). Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Action_research 
Participatory action research builds on social-psychology theory via Lewin (1946) and pedagogy 
via Freire (1970). Participatory action research also explicitly employs a cyclical approach in 
which action and research are planned, enacted, observed, evaluated and critically reflected on in 
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iterative cycles (McNiff & Whitehead 2009; O'Brien 2001). Although the focus in participatory 
action research is on engaging all stakeholders in the process of action and change, it is 
constructed as a reflective process. 
 
Figure 4. A simpler representation of action research. Source: 
https://www.det.nsw.edu.au/proflearn/research/actres.htm 
More broadly, action-research processes employ feedback loops to evaluate and modify the aim 
and methodology of the research in question, during the research. Figure 4 gives a diagrammatic 
representation of these processes, in which change is enacted through three basic steps: 
unfreezing, where the need for change is recognised through a critical incident or incidents; 
changing, where the processes and models are altered and tested; and refreezing, where the new 
model is evaluated and either rejected or adopted. The feedback loops represent the possible 
transitions to other states; for example, if a new model is unsatisfactory, loop B is in operation and 
the model undergoes further change and evaluation. 
This conception is in fact a rather complex tangle. Figure 5 gives a visual representation of the 
untangling. This representation again shows the four basic steps linked together in a feedback 
loop, where an action is performed, results observed and reflected on and any changes planned. Of 
particular note is the identification of verbs that describe the transitions between the different 
stages of the action-research process. These verbs are echoed in the detailed reflective methods of 
Kolb and Johns. 
Models of Science 
Science (derived from the Latin scientia, or “knowledge”) as we conceive of it in the modern 
world is a complex and manifold idea. In one sense, it is “simply” a collection of reliable 
knowledge about the natural world. This meaning dates back at least to Aristotle, although 
Aristotle only considered high-order theorising as science – the actual gathering of data was 
secondary (Aristotle n.d., p. VI 1139b). The Renaissance and the Enlightenment reformed this 
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view through the experimental work of Bacon, Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Brahe, Hook, Lavoisier 
and others. In this new conception, embodied first by Roger Bacon and expounded in the third 
volume of Newton’s Philosophæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica, empirical observation and 
experimentation was emphasised as the core method through which science could be advanced. 
The coalescence of these ideas by the 19th century led to the explicit concept of the scientific 
method. Before discussing the scientific method further, it is illuminating to consider some 
philosophical definitions and explanations of science (as science is not identical to the scientific 
method), bearing in mind the goals of reflective practice. 
 
Figure 5. The basic cycle of the scientific method. Source: 
http://mccarthyi.edu.glogster.com/mrsmacscitoolz/ 
Siepmann (1999) provides perhaps one of simplest but still meaningful definitions of science as 
"the field of study which attempts to describe and understand the nature of the universe in whole 
or part". Considering this in the context of reflective practice, science could be conceived of as 
reflection on nature, in contrast to the human-practice focus of critical reflective practice.  
Gilbert provides an alternative perspective: 
One possibility is to define science as a process of constructing predictive 
conceptual models. This definition unites both the processes and product of 
science…. Within this framework, the purpose of research is to produce models 
which represent consistent, predictive relationships. 
(Gilbert 1991, p. 73) 
Again, if this definition of science is considered in the context of the aims of critical reflective 
practice, the synergies become apparent:  critical reflective practice aims to produce models of 
practice that are predictive, in the sense that they provide predictable results, and consistent, in that 
they match the reality of the practice’s context.  
One of the key elements of science is that its conclusions are built on observation; that is, its claims 
should be empirically falsifiable; that is, able to be challenged and perhaps disproved (Popper 
1934). Although not formulated in this manner, critical reflective practice employs the same idea: 
models are formulated (this is identical to making a claim) and tested in practice to discern their 








The Scientific Method 
 
Figure 6. An expression of the scientific method. Source: 
http://scene.asu.edu/habitat/s_method.html 
The key methodological philosophy that guides the vast majority of scientific practice is the 
scientific method. In practice this term refers to a body of techniques that satisfy certain 
constraints. Chief amongst these is that the evidence must be empirical and measurable1 (Newton 
1687). This empiricism is summed up by Ørsted (1997, p. 292): “The foundation of general 
physics...is experience. These...everyday experiences we do not discover without deliberately 
directing our attention to them. Collecting information about these is observation.” Alongside this, 
four basic steps outline the structure of most expositions of the scientific method (Godfrey-Smith 
2003; Jevons 1874; Galilei 1638): 
1. Observation of interesting phenomena. (Ørsted 1997) 
2. Hypothesis regarding the explanation. (Feynman 1965; Ørsted 1997) 
3. Prediction based on the hypothesis. (Ørsted 1997) 
4. Experimental testing of the hypothesis. (Galilei 1638) 
                                                          
1 Though “measurable” is the typical term, “comparable” may be more accurate. Similarly, “quantifiable” tends to cause unnecessary 
consternation when the real intent is that phenomena be adequately describable such that accurate and useful information can be derived, 
rather than that there is a particular set of numerical units that can be used to quantify them. 
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Figure 7. A more complex visualisation of the scientific method. Note the emphasis on the 
step labelled "Think!". Source: http://www.sciencebuddies.org/science-fair-
projects/project_scientific_method.shtml 
Importantly, these steps occur in iterations, or even recursions, with whole cycles interleaved 
between steps. Brody (1993, p. 10) says that this “epistemic cycle starts from an initial model; 
iterations of the cycle then improve the model until an adequate fit is achieved”.  
While different presentations of the scientific method vary in complexity and detail, all have at 
their heart this repeating cycle of observation, hypothesis, prediction and testing, or in the 
terminology used to describe critical reflective practice, experience, reflection, formation of 
abstract models and testing. In fact, some formulations make this resonance even clearer. For 
example, Figure 6, which gives a naturalistic presentation of the scientific method, explicitly 
includes reflection as a key step – note that it also highlights the cyclical nature of the 
experimental process, showing reflection as a result of the observation of the results. 
Other formulations reflect further aspects of reflective practices. Figures 4 and 5 in particular 
show the level of congruence in the basic format of the scientific method and the basic format of 
action research. 
Even when different aspects are emphasised, the underlying essence of both processes that 
embody critically reflective practice and those that embody scientific practice – the dominant 
example of which being the scientific method – show clear systemic and philosophic congruencies 
(Gibbs 1988, p.1). In particular, the scientific method emphasises critical reflective thought 
(Figure 7). The key difference is that critically reflective practice takes as its subject systems and 
processes enacted by humans in a societal context, whereas the scientific method focuses on 
natural phenomena and systems.  
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While it is clear that critical reflective practice and science share some basic methodological 
philosophies, the relationship stems from a deeper source. Epistemology is the branch of 
philosophy concerned with knowledge: what it is, how it is acquired and to what extent things can 
be known. 
Naturally, both critical reflective practice and science are deeply concerned with epistemology, 
though often tacitly.  They are both concerned with acquiring knowledge and using it to advance 
our understanding and capabilities.  Interestingly, despite the depth and complexity of 
epistemology as a branch of philosophy, both critical reflective practice and science have arrived 
at essentially the same practical model of epistemology. 
Given that critical reflective practice and science are practically oriented, it is natural that in terms 
of their epistemology they are both primarily concerned with how knowledge is acquired, rather 
than what knowledge is. While, ultimately, the discourse regarding traditional conceptions of 
knowledge, the Gettier problem (Gettier 1963), reliabilism (Goldman 1967) and the debate 
between internalism and externalism (Cohen 1984; Brueckner 1999; Putnam 1981) have 
implications for both, the fact that they remain unresolved philosophical questions renders them in 
practice irrelevant to any field of inquiry that requires knowledge to be collected. 
A fundamental distinction between methods of obtaining knowledge is whether knowledge is a 
priori (known independently of experience) or a posteriori (dependent on experience). While there 
are, no doubt, some who would argue, it seems natural any area of inquiry where the goal is to 
develop working models of external systems (good professional practice such as teaching, on one 
hand, the natural world on the other) would come quickly to the conclusion that the relevant 
knowledge must be a posteriori: while a particular model may be right from first conception, the 
only way to know with any degree of certainty is to test it empirically. 
An examination of a posteriori knowledge leads naturally to empiricism. While there are several 
types of empiricism, the common element is an emphasis on knowledge gained through 
experience. In particular, Pierce’s (1903) modification of empiricism, pragmatism, ties together 
elements of British empiricism, phenomenalism, logical positivism and rationalism. It emphasises 
knowledge from experience and rational, conceptual thinking. By allowing inductive and 
deductive reasoning to complement each other, rather than compete, and by developing the idea of 
abductive reasoning (essentially the process of hypothesising in the formal sense), Pierce tied 
together many notions of science and the scientific method into a coherent whole.  It was Pierce’s 
influence that led Dewey to instrumentalism (Dewey 1903), which  has come to inform the theory 
of critical reflective practice as it stands today. 
Conclusion, or what was the point of all that? 
It is certainly intellectually interesting to examine what seem to be two fields of thought far 
removed from each other and find such similarity. To trace this similarity back to an essential 
underlying philosophy of natural and effective knowledge development demonstrates that such 
methods are often effective well beyond that area. However, this is not the only reason that such 
an effort is interesting. 
It should be beyond doubt that quality science forms one of the key pillars of an enlightened 
society; to ignore the natural world is at best foolish, at worst fatal. Similarly, quality in education 
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is essential to the functioning of society. Without an educated populace we cannot hope to 
improve the world in any significant way. To quote Thomas Jefferson: “I know of no safe 
depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them 
not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to 
take it from them, but inform their discretion” (Jefferson 1820). Indeed, without education, science 
quickly crumbles. Education is the cornerstone of functional democracy and the key to diverse, 
tolerant society (Taylor 1990). 
Thus it is important that the methods employed in either area are as good as they can possibly be. 
Improvement should be continually sought, at both the personal and societal level. Possibly the 
most effective method for spreading improvement is via the sharing of information gathered 
through critical reflection.  By highlighting the close relationship between science and critical 
reflective practice we hope to extend the discourse to new participants, to expand the pool of 
ideas, to draw good ideas from wider sources and to link disciplines together. 
The demonstration of such similarities is also important in overcoming academic partitions, 
currently referred to as “silo-isation”. Academic disciplines tend to wall themselves off from each 
other. In the best case this leads to unnecessary repetition of important research. In the worst one 
discipline might actively shun ideas from another, to both their detriment. Education academics 
may reject science, falsely equating it with obsessive measurement and calculation, thus depriving 
themselves of centuries of methodological learning and scholarship; similarly, scientists may 
reject educational theory to the obvious detriment of their students and thus their fields. There is 
no reason why this should remain the case. Education needs to embrace science, and science, 
education.  As Snow (1959, p. 53) writes, “there are steps to be taken which aren’t outside the 
powers of reflective people”, and while “education isn’t the total solution to this problem, without 
education [we] can’t even begin to cope”; therefore, “closing the gap between our two cultures is a 
necessity....  When those two senses have grown apart, then no society is going to be able to think 
with wisdom”. 
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